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Comment
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE IN
NEBRASKA-AN ASSET OR LIABILITY
FOR THE OUT-OF-STATE DEFENDANT?
The ever increasing use of the automobile by the American pub-
lic has caused a corresponding increase in the amount of litigation
resulting from this use.- When this litigation involves a traffic acci-
dent occurring outside the jurisdiction of the state courts where the
plaintiff brings suit, particular problems arise. If the court can
obtain in personam jurisdiction over the defendant either by finding
him in the state2 or by a voluntary appearance3 these problems can
be partially alleviated.4 In the majority of the cases, however, this
will not be possible and the plaintiff will either have to seek a
forum where he can obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant,5
or obtain in rem or quasi in remn6 jurisdiction over an asset the
defendant may have in the jurisdiction where the plaintiff is
situated.
1 It has been estimated that the cost to the nation of motor vehicle
accidents in 1967 was approximately $10.7 billion. This figure includes
wage losses, medical expenses, insurance administration costs, and
property damage in motor vehicle accidents. The deaths caused by
traffic accidents in 1967 alone were 53,100. Hearings on H.R. 17134
Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the House Comm. on Public Works,
90th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 542, 546 (1968).
2 Adair County Bank v. Forrey, 74 Neb. 811, 105 N.W. 714 (1905).
3Dennick v. Central R.R. of N.J., 103 U.S. 11 (1880); Reed v. Mott,
2 Neb. (Unof.) 450, 89 N.W. 277 (1902).
4 Obtaining necessary witnesses, concurrent suits pending in the otherjurisdiction, and increased costs of the litigation are a few of the
problems with which the court will still be faced.
5 This may be a jurisdiction where the defendant can be personally
served, such as his place of domicile or the place of the accident if
the state has a long arm statute.
6 "Actions in rem, strictly considered, are proceedings against property
alone, treated as responsible for the claims asserted by the libelants or
plaintiffs. The property itself is in such actions the defendant, and,
except in cases arising during war, for its hostile character, its for-
feiture or sale is sought for the wrong....
There is, however, a large class of cases which are not strictly
actions in rem, but are frequently spoken of as actions quasi in rem,
because, though brought against persons, they only seek to subject
certain property of those persons to the discharge of the claim
asserted. [T]hey differ, among other things, from actions which are
strictly in rem, in that the interest of the defendant is alone sought
to be affected, that citation to him is required, and that judgment
therein is only conclusive between the parties." Freeman v. Alderson,
119 U.S. 185, 187-88 (1886). See generally Beale, The Exercise of Juris-
diction in Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt, 27 HARV. L. REv. 107
(1913).
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One possible method of obtaining jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant for an out-of-state accident is to use the defendant's auto-
mobile liability policy alleging it to be an asset. If the insurance
company is doing business in the plaintiff's state this "asset" may
then be asserted as establishing the basis of a quasi in rem proceed-
ing, thus allowing the plaintiff the convenience of his home forum.7
This comment will examine the feasibility of obtaining this method
of jurisdiction in Nebraska; (1) by using the policy of insurance to
establish an administration proceeding in those cases where the
defendant is deceased, and (2) by garnishing the insurance policy
as an asset of the defendant in all other applicable cases.$
I. THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF AN ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDING
The Nebraska Supreme Court recently faced the issue of whether
a liability insurance policy created an asset in this state subject to
administration when the accident occurred outside the state, and
the defendant was otherwise unreachable by service of process.9
In Calkins v. Witt, 10 the administrator of a deceased Nebraska
resident who died in a Kansas traffic accident brought an action for
the appointment of an administrator of the defendant who was also
killed in the accident. Since the defendant was not a resident of
Nebraska, the appointment of the administrator was dependent upon
the establishment of a property right of the defendant in property
located in the state." A California-issued liability insurance policy
was asserted to be the asset needed for granting the letters of ad-
7 The convenience of the home forum for the plaintiff primarily involves
that of expense. There may be other conveniences depending on the
theory of conflict of law the state applies and the tendency of the
courts to allow large jury awards. Thus, the plaintiff who can obtain
quasi in rem jurisdiction over the defendant can "forum shop" to a
certain degree.
8 This comment is based on the assumption that the accident occurred
outside of the jurisdiction of the Nebraska courts and the insurance
company is "doing business" in the state. If the accident occurred
within Nebraska, jurisdiction is now easily obtained by using the
Nebraska Long Arm Statute that took effect in October of 1967.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-536 (Supp. 1967).
9 The Nebraska Supreme Court had previously decided that a liability
policy was an asset subject to administration when the accident oc-
curred within the state. Cox v. Kresovich, 168 Neb. 673, 97 N.W.2d
239 (1959). At that time Nebraska did not have a long arm statute.
Jurisdiction in the Nebraska courts, therefore, was dependent upon
finding an asset in this state even though the accident occurred in
Nebraska.
10 183 Neb. 178, 159 N.W.2d 199 (1968).
11 NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-314 (Reissue 1964).
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ministration. The insurance company was doing business in Ne-
braska and reachable by process. The court applied the reasoning
of Cox v. Kresovich12 that a "contractual assumption of prospective
liability of the decedent insured was an asset of the deceased during
his lifetime and of his estate on his death"'13 thereby reaching the
conclusion that the granting of the administration was proper be-
cause the insurance policy did create an asset in the state.
The creation in Nebraska of an asset arising from a foreign-
issued policy of liability insurance to a nonresident insured cover-
ing an accident occurring outside of the jurisdiction of the Nebraska
courts is, however, left in doubt because the court "reversed solely
on the procedural issue."'1 4 This procedural issue concerned the
county court's finding that the deceased left an estate in the county.
In holding the asset question to be final, thereby establishing an
estate for which letters of administration could be issued, the su-
preme court stated:
The county court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and deter-
mined the fact issue between the same parties. The order granting
administration was an appealable order .... No appeal was taken.
The appellees are now precluded by the rules of res judicata from
relitigating the issue of the existence or absence of that fact. A
question of fact once litigated on its merits is settled as to the liti-
gants and may not be relitigated directly or collaterally by the liti-
gants or their privies .... A court's jurisdiction of the subject matter
may be raised directly or collaterally but here the matter of fact
of the existence of an asset was litigated and the determination
became final. To permit relitigation and redetermination would
violate the first principles [of] res judicata and the necessity for
finality in the litigation of fact issues.15
The Nebraska court prefaced this reversal stating "we have
reached the issues presented on the merits,"'16 which indicates that
the initial part of the opinion would have to be given more weight
than ordinary dictum. If the assumption is correct that the Calkins
case was decided on its merits, but reversed because of a procedural
defect, the opinion should be examined as to its merits.
The court premises its holding on the belief that the situs of the
tort claim and the issue of whether the deceased defendant has left
assets in the state requiring the appointment of an administrator
are not rationally connected. Supporting this belief, the court adds
that "[a]n accident does not produce assets in a tort-feasor, but a
contractual claim against a reachable insurer does."'17
12 168 Neb. 673, 97 N.W.2d 239 (1959).
13 Calkins v. Witt, 183 Neb. 178, 179, 159 N.W.2d 199, 201 (1968).
14 Id. at 182, 159 N.W.2d at 202.
15 Id. at 183, 159 N.W.2d at 202.
16 Id. at 182, 159 N.W.2d at 202.
17 Id. at 181, 159 N.W.2d at 201.
COMMENTS
An examination of the case authority used in the Calkins case' 8
reveals that only one of the quoted cases, In re Riggle's Estate,9
involved a situation where the state that granted the administration
was not also the place of the accident.20 The Riggle's case is dis-
tinguishable from Calkins. In Riggle's, the contract of insurance
had been issued in the forum state. Personal service was also ob-
tained on the defendant in the forum state where the administration
proceedings were initiated before his death. While these cases do
lend support to the Kresovich rationale, it does not follow that the
same may be said about Calkins.
In Kresovich the accident happened in Nebraska, and the out-of-
state plaintiff successfully petitioned for the letters of administra-
tion to be issued in Nebraska. In Calkins, on the other hand, the
plaintiff did not choose to go to the place of the accident (Kansas)
or the residence of the deceased (California), but instead sought to
litigate the matter in his home state (Nebraska). The Nebraska Su-
preme Court did not feel these differences were significant and
applied the Kresovich rationale to Calkins, upholding the appoint-
ment of an administrator.
The underlying assumption of Calkins is that an insurance policy
is an asset of a deceased person sufficient to establish an adminis-
tration proceeding. In Kresovich the court reasoned that the insur-
ance policy was an asset of the insured at the time the contract was
made "and remained such and followed him until his death, after
which it became [the] estate of the insured in the jurisdiction
where he came to his death."21 The court in Calkins could not rely
on this theory because the death did not occur in Nebraska. If the
insurance policy in Calkins followed the defendant to his death it
would not be an asset in Nebraska.
Instead, the court relied on the theory that "the insurance com-
pany should be required to respond in [the] forum where its con-
tractual risk reaches and where it does business.122 The court felt
that the policy involved protects Nebraska residents no matter
where the accident occurs.
This may be true if the policy is issued to the Nebraska resident,
but in the Calkins case the policy was issued to a nonresident. The
risk the insurance company contracted for was the liability that the
18 The court cites In re Estate of Gardinier, 40 N.J. 261, 191 A.2d 294
(1963).
19 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962).
20 In re Estate of Gardinier, 40 N.J. 261, 267-68 n.1, 191 A.2d 294, 297-98
n.1 (1963).
21 Cox v. Kresovich, 168 Neb. 673, 680, 97 N.W.2d 239, 244 (1959).
22 Calkins v. Witt, 183 Neb. 178, 181, 159 N.W.2d 199, 202 (1968).
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insured might incur, not the damage to the plaintiff (the Nebraska
resident). The court misconstrues the fundamental characteristic
of the liability policy, i.e., to protect against liability. The contrac-
tual risk only reaches as far as the defendant "reached" and this
did not include the state of Nebraska. An insurance company has no
obligation to pay until the liability of the insured is established.
To interpret the policy in the manner of the Nebraska court is to
make it a third party beneficiary contract.
The misunderstanding of the risks covered by a liability policy
leads the court to assume that the due process clause of the United
States Constitution was not violated, stating:
Within the meaning of due process it is recognized that a state
has a legitimate interest in all insurance policies protecting its resi-
dents against risks, an interest which the state can protect even
though the "state action may have repercussions beyond state
lines."23
The court's statement is an accurate picture of the due process
clause where the policies protect its residents against risk. This
picture does not fit the framework of the CaZkins case because, as
already stated, the risk protected was not that of the Nebraska
resident but that of the insured. As will be examined, infra, the
Nebraska court, by enlarging the insurer's obligation lawfully cre-
ated in another state, may have deprived the insurer of due process.2
In any event, the due process issue cannot be dismissed as easily as
the court has done in Calkins.
As previously noted, defendant's counsel did not preserve the
asset question so that the supreme court did not have to decide that
issue on appeal. In a future case where the asset question must be
decided by the supreme court, a more logical approach to the prob-
lem could be taken by holding that the insurer's obligation to defend
the insured creates an asset subject to administration in this state
upon the defendant's death. Even this approach is subject to a
serious flaw.
To call a policy of insurance an asset in Nebraska on the sole
grounds that the insurer "does business" in Nebraska is to conclude
that the same insurance policy is an asset in every other state where
the insurance company does business. In a case where multiple
plaintiffs are involved, this could result in administration proceed-
ings in several states all involving a single policy. If there is still
23 Id., citing Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
24 See, e.g., Hartford Ind. Co. v. Delta Co., 292 U.S. 143, 150 (1934) (hold-
ing a state could not change the insurer's obligation to pay where the
contract was validly created in one state if the interests of the forum
are not substantial without violating due process of law).
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the need to use a policy of insurance as an asset to obtain jurisdic-
tion, even though Nebraska now has a long-arm statute,2 it should
be limited to those cases where the accident occurred in the state.
In a Calkins situation, a plaintiff who ultimately recovers will
be limited to the amount of the policy, because the defendant did
not have the "minimum contacts" required to obtain in persoram
jurisdiction over the decedent's estate.26 In a sense this becomes a
quasi in rem proceeding adjudicating no other assets of the deceased
defendant except the policy of insurance. If this quasi in rem pro-
cedure is effective in Nebraska in the case of a decedent's estate,
such as the Calkins case, the logical extension is to apply the pro-
cedure to a case where the defendant was not killed and in personam
jurisdiction cannot be obtained.
The theory of the plaintiff would be to garnish the insurance
policy as a "debt owed" under the Harris v. Balk27 rationale that a
creditor can garnish any assets of his debtor that he can find in his
jurisdiction. To make this transition, the "asset" of the Calkins case
must be collectable under the Nebraska garnishment statutes. 28
The New York courts have adopted this method of garnishment. An
examination of the New York test should now be considered.
II. THE SEIDER DOCTRINE
In Seider v. Roth29 the plaintiffs brought suit in New York
alleging injuries caused by an accident in Vermont. The defendant
was a resident of Canada and not subject to in personam jurisdic-
tion in New York. The plaintiff had attachment papers served in
New York on defendant's insurance company alleging the contrac-
tual obligation of the insurance company to defend and indemnify
as a debt attachable under the New York statutes.30 The New York
court accepted this theory reasoning that the duty of the insurer to
defend any place where jurisdiction is obtained over the insured
was a debt owed the insured by the insurer, according to prior New
York case law,3 1 and subject to attachment. This "bootstrap situa-
25 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-536 (Supp. 1967). The fact Nebraska did not
have a long arm statute may have influenced the Nebraska court in
Kresovich. Without a finding of an "asset" in this state in the Kreso-
vich case the plaintiff would have been without a remedy.
26 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (holding
one contact with the forum sufficient to sustain jurisdiction); Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
27 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
28 NEB. Rrv. STAT. §§ 25-1001, -1010 (Reissue 1964).
29 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
30 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 5201, 6202.
31 lure Riggle, 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962).
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tion"3 2 has been criticized by various sources33 but the holding was
affirmed by the New York court in a later case.3 4 While various
New York statutes initially posed constitutional problems of deny-
ing the defendant his property without the opportunity to be
heard,35 the court of appeals adopted a limited appearance by the
defendant that by-passed these objections.36 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has approved this method
of jurisdiction, ruling that due process was not violated.3 7
The Seider doctrine has been compared to direct action stat-
utes3s which some states have adopted.3 9 The constitutionality of
these statutes has been upheld by the United States Supreme Court
in Watson v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp.40 The Watson case
involved the Louisiana direct action statute41 which allowed injured
persons to bring direct actions against liability insurance companies
that have issued policies covering liabilities of the alleged negligent
party. The plaintiff in the Watson case was allegedly injured by a
home permanent manufactured by a corporation which was not
subject to service of process in Louisiana. The Supreme Court in
upholding the Louisiana statute felt:
32 Sieder v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 115, 216 N.E.2d 312, 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d
99, 103 (1966) (Burke, J., dissenting opinion).
33 Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); La Brum, The
Fruits of Babcock and Seider: Injustice, Uncertainty and Forum Shop-
ping, 54 A.B.A.J. 747 (1968); Comment, 67 COLU-n. L. REv. 550 (1967);
Comment, 19 STAN. L. REv. 654 (1967).
34 Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d
633 (1967), rehearing denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290
N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968).
35 Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
36 Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d
914 (1968).
37 Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), petition for cert.
ftled, 37 U.S.L.W. 3487 (U.S. June 17, 1969) (No. 1461, 1968 Term;
renumbered No. 177, 1969 Term) (The question posed to the Supreme
Court is: May a nonresident who has no personal contacts within New
York and who purchases and receives an automobile policy outside
New York, consistent with due process, be subjected to suit in New
York for an out-of-state accident solely because his insurer has an
office in New York and plaintiff is a resident thereof?). The Supreme
Court has dismissed a petition for certiorari based on a claim that the
Seider doctrine interferes with interstate commerce "for want of a
federal question." Hanover Ins. Co. v. Victor, 393 U.S. 7 (1968).
38 Note, 51 MV/N_. L. REv. 158 (1966).
39 LA. REv. STAT. § 22:655 (Supp. 1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-7-1
(1956); WIS. STAT. § 260.11 (Supp. 1969). See also P.R. LAws ANN.
tit. 26, §§ 2001, 2003 (Supp. 1957).
40 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
41 LA. REV. STAT. § 22:655 (Supp. 1969), formerly, § 22:655 (1958).
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Louisiana's direct action statute is not a mere intermeddling in
affairs beyond her boundaries which are no concern of hers. Per-
sons injured or killed in Louisiana are most likely to be Louisiana
residents, and even if not, Louisiana may have to care for them....
Moreover, Louisiana courts in most instances provide the most
convenient forum for trial of these cases.... What has been said
is enough to show Louisiana's legitimate interest in safeguarding
the rights of persons injured there.4 2
The court's concern with the fact that the accident occurred in
Louisiana should be considered in light of the Seider doctrine which
is usually applied where the accident and the resulting medical
expenses occur in another state. The main interest of the plaintiff's
home state in this situation is the resulting medical expenses the
plaintiff may suffer at home. When compared with the interest of
the state where the accident occurred, this would appear to be
slight in the great majority of cases. Where the state's interest
in a contractual relationship is slight, the state may not impose a
greater contractual obligation on the parties than what was agreed
upon and validly executed by the parties in another state. To do so
would violate the federal due process clause.43 The ultimate ques-
tion of the constitutionality of Seider, therefore, appears to rest on
the issue of whether a state has a sufficient legitimate interest in
altering a valid contract of insurance based solely on the ground
that the plaintiff is a resident of the state.44 The question should
now be considered whether Seider is adaptable to a garnishment
proceeding in Nebraska.
42 Watson v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1954).
43 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930). See also Hartford
Acci. & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Lane Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934).
44 If Seider was based on in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction assuming
the insurance policy is property in the state, an appellate court deci-
sion appears to have limited this holding where the plaintiff is not
a New York resident. Vaage v. Lewis, 29 App. Div. 2d 315, 288
N.Y.S.2d 521 (1968). In the Vaage case a Norwegian brought suit
against North Carolina defendants for a North Carolina accident.
The court dismissed the suit on the doctrine of forum non conveniens
since the North Carolina courts were open to this entirely foreign
litigation. See also Minichiello v. Rosenberg, note 37 supra, at 110,
where the court doubts whether Seider could be constitutionally
applied where the state was neither the place of injury nor the
plaintiff's residence, and Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d
812 (2d Cir. 1969), where the court held that New York administrators
of estates of nonresidents could-not attach liability policies of defend-
ants who were not subject to ih personam jurisdiction in New York,
although insurers did business in New York.
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III. SEIDER AND NEBRASKA GARNISHMENT
Calkins v. Witt has laid the framework for the possible adoption
of the Seider rule in Nebraska.45 This framework rests, however,
on an unstable foundation of statutory and case law concerning
attachment and garnishment. The Nebraska statutes on attachment
and garnishment 46 are more restrictive than those of New York.
47
The New York statute allows the garnishment of any property
which could be assigned or transferred regardless of whether it is
vested. The same is true of debts, which are past due or which are
yet to become due, certainly or upon demand. The Nebraska statute
is not as explicit, stating only that a plaintiff can have an attach-
ment against the property of the defendant if, among other things,
he is a nonresident of the state. Standing alone the statute could
be interpreted to include contingent as well as certain debts, thus
falling under the Seider holding. But court interpretations of the
statutes do not allow this freedom.
The first obstacle faced in trying to apply Seider to a garnish-
ment proceeding in Nebraska is the tendency of the court to refuse
garnishment where the debt is contingent. In Salyers Auto Co. v.
DeVore,48 the Nebraska court looked to Pennoyer v. Neff49 and de-
cided that in a garnishment proceeding involving an out-of-state
defendant the jurisdiction of the court "would be limited in cases
of attachment based solely on the ground of nonresidence to what
was actually levied upon at the time for service of process." 50 The
claims involved in Salyers were dependent upon collection of money
from third persons, not upon a liability insurance policy as in the
Seider situation. But the rationale is the same-a creditor has noth-
ing to levy upon if the debtor's claim is only contingent.
The Pennoyer rule may have been relaxed by the United States
Supreme Court's decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,51
since the contact necessary for jurisdiction over the defendant is
45 This framework, however, is subject to the qualification that a liability
policy covering an accident occurring out of the state is an asset in
Nebraska of the deceased non-resident. As mentioned in Part II, this
question was not before the Nebraska Supreme Court since no direct
appeal was taken from the county court's finding that the policy was
an asset.
46 NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-1001, -1010 (Reissue 1964).
47 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 5201.
48 116 Neb. 317, 217 N.W. 94 (1927).
49 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
50 Salyers Auto Co. v. DeVore, 116 Neb. 317, 324, 217 N.W. 94, 97 (1927).
51 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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not as great.52 The holding in Salyers, however, does not appear to
be affected since, subsequent to International Shoe, Salyers was fol-
lowed by the Nebraska court.53 Since any garnishment of a liability
insurance policy would have to be based on the contingent claims of
the insured against the insurer, a major obstacle to a Seider argu-
ment would appear.
Assuming a court could distinguish Salyers on the ground that
the holding applied only to contingent claims for collection of money
from third persons, the plaintiff's counsel would then have to prove
that at the time of garnishment the defendant had a "legal demand"
due from the garnishee. In Chicago, B & Q R.R. Co. v. Van Cleave,5 4
the plaintiff tried to garnish the wages of the defendant owed by
the garnishee. In reversing the lower court, the Nebraska Supreme
Court observed:
A person is not liable as garnishee unless it affirmatively appears
that at the time of the garnishment the defendant had a cause of
action against him for the recovery of a legal demand due, or to
become due by the efflux of time.55
Since the defendant, at best, would have no rights against the insur-
ance company until he was served with a summons, there would
be no grounds for garnishment. If the defendant did have a right
such as medical payments or collision coverage, the plaintiff could
garnish the amount owed. This generally would be a small amount
so as not to be worthwhile and in most cases the insurance com-
pany will have already paid the amount due. The basic reasoning
behind holding a legal obligation necessary for garnishment is the
feeling that the plaintiff's (creditor) claims can rise no higher than
that of the defendant (debtor) when dealing with the garnishee.
The rule has been followed extensively in Nebraska55 and is con-
sistent with the idea that since garnishment is a statutory remedy, a
litigant seeking such relief must find his authority in the statute, 7
52 See Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In
Personam Jurisdiction of the State Courts from Pennoyer to Denckla:
A Review, 25 U. Cm. L. Rav. 569 (1958).
53 Certain-teed Products Corp. v. Carlisle, 156 Neb. 185, 55 N.W.2d 489
(1952).
54 52 Neb. 67, 71 N.W. 971 (1897).
55 Id. at 70, 71 N.W. at 972.
56 Certain-teed Products Corp v. Carlisle, 156 Neb. 185, 55 N.W.2d 489
(1952); Smith v. Brooks, 154 Neb. 93, 47 N.W.2d 389 (1951); Royal
Tire Service v. George W. Bell Co., 139 Neb. 238, 297 N.W. 88 (1941);
Cahn v. Carpless Co., 61 Neb. 512, 85 N.W. 538 (1901).
57 Pupkes v. Sailors, 183 Neb. 784, 164 N.W.2d 441 (1969); Hinds State
Bank v. Loffier, 113 Neb. 110, 202 N.W. 465 (1925).
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If the plaintiff successfully steers his way past these problems,
the insurance company may still have the last word. A simple
clause in the insurance contract to the effect that the contract is
payable to the defendant only in the state where the accident
occurred or where the defendant resides would cause the policy to
be garnish free in Nebraska. 58 Nebraska follows the rule that a
debtor can only be garnished in a state where the debt is payable.
Bullard v. Chaffee59 held this to be the settled rule of the state
subject to change by the legislature alone. Even without an ex-
pressed clause in the insurance contract, defense counsel could
argue the reasonable expectations of the parties would be that the
insurance company would only have to pay in those states where
the defendant could be subjected to in personam jurisdiction thereby
complying with this exception to garnishment proceedings.
The problems encountered with the existing garnishment statutes
could be successfully met with either legislative or judicial work-
manship. Thus, the ultimate question becomes whether a Seider
doctrine is desirable in Nebraska.
IV. DESIRABILITY OF SEIDER IN NEBRASKA
The obvious advantage of a Seider method of jurisdiction is to
allow the plaintiff the opportunity to litigate an accident, occurring
in a foreign jurisdiction, in his home forum. The Seider rationale
is not needed when the accident occurs in Nebraska, however, be-
cause of the long-arm statute.6 0 Use of this statute will enable the
plaintiff to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Seider,
on the other hand, proceeds only along quasi in rem lines.
In the normal case, the insurance will probably cover all the
damages incurred, but there is no reason to limit the plaintiff's
jurisdiction unnecessarily. In a situation where counsel is tempted
to use a Seider argument in order to allow the plaintiff to litigate
"at home," the statute of limitations should always be kept in mind.
By the time the litigation reaches the supreme court, the statute
may have run, and if the court rejects the argument, it will be too
late to file a petition under the long-arm statute or in a state where
jurisdiction was easily obtainable.
58 For an example of a proposed clause in a policy of insurance to avoid
jurisdiction in those states where the defendant is not subject to
personal service see La Brum, The Fruits of Babcock and Seider:
Injustice, Uncertainty and Forum Shopping, 54 A.B.A.J. 747, 751
(1968).
59 61 Neb. 83, 84 N.W. 604 (1900).
60 NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-536 (Supp. 1967).
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If the case is subject to federal jurisdiction the defendant may
be able to nullify the advantages gained by the plaintiff who im-
poses the Seider rationale by removing the litigation to federal
court. This results because:
Once in federal court, [actions of the Seider type] become subject
to the salutary provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) that "for the con-
venience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a dis-
trict court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought." Either the district of
the defendant's residence or that of the accident, or both, will
qualify for transfer.61
Since a proceeding under the Seider theory is quasi in rem, any
judgment the plaintiff may obtain will be limited to the amount of
the insurance policy.62 If the plaintiff's judgment is in excess of the
policy limits, the plaintiff will have to proceed against the defendant
for the remainder of the claim in another jurisdiction where the
defendant can be personally served. It is doubtful whether the
plaintiff could use the prior judgment as a basis of collateral
estoppel or res judicata since the defendant has not had his day in
court.6 3 This may not be a worthy consideration in some cases due
to the lack of assets, apart from the insurance policy, of some
defendants.
In those cases where the policy limits are insufficient to compen-
sate for the plaintiff's damages and the defendants do have addi-
tional assets, a Seider litigation will force the plaintiff to try two
lawsuits instead of one: one in the plaintiff's forum adjudicating
the policy of insurance, and the other in a forum where the defend-
ant can be personally served for the remainder of the damages. On
the other hand, the plaintiff could be estopped from instigating a
second suit against the defendant if he loses the suit in his home
forum on its merits.6 The doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel, then, do not appear to help the plaintiff who wishes to
stay in his home forum, especially when the possibility of a judg-
ment over the policy limits may occur.
61 Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 119 (2nd Cir. 1968). See also
Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
aff'd, Farrell v. Wyatt, 408 F.2d 662 (2nd Cir. 1969); Jarvik v. Magic
Mountain Corp., 290 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
62 Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d
914 (1968).
63 See generally, 1968 Supplementary Practice Commentary to N.Y. Civ.
PRuc. LAw § 5201; Note, 47 NEB. L. REV. 640 (1968).
64 Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v. Sternberg Dredging Co., 189 Miss. 73,
191 So. 94 (1939); note 63 supra.
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A further difficulty inherent in the Seider doctrine is the ease
of extinguishing the garnished asset of the defendant (the insurance
policy) merely by failing to meet the conditions precedent found
in every policy of insurance.6 5 Primary among these is the obliga-
tion of the defendant to cooperate with the insurer in litigating the
suit. If the insurance company can show a breach of the duty to
cooperate on the part of the defendant, the policy will be ineffectual
and the plaintiff will lose jurisdiction. If in personam jurisdiction
is obtained, the plaintiff will not lose his cause of action against
the defendant in the event of the defendant's breach of one of the
conditions precedent, even though his chance of collection of a
judgment may be greatly diminished. It should be noted, however,
that an insurance company in Nebraska has the burden to show
not only non-cooperation but that the non-cooperation led to the
detriment or prejudice of the insurer.66
In Pupkes v. Sailors,67 the Nebraska Supreme Court refused to
allow the insurance company to avoid payment to the judgment
creditor of its insured for injuries caused in an accident. The court
held the fact the defendant did not show up for the trial was not
prejudicial per se to the insurer. The court felt "[r]egardless of the
nature of the breach, there must be a showing of detriment or preju-
dice to the insurer. '68 Assuming prejudice can be shown on the
part of the insurance company, a plaintiff by use of a Seider ration-
ale may force the defendant to breach the cooperation clause
because the defendant may not be willing to come to the plain-
tiff's forum to litigate the matter. The use of interrogatories
and depositions may ease this burden on the defendant, but there is
still the possibility of collusion between the insurer and the insured
to delay the plaintiff in hopes of a settlement. While a breach of
the terms of the policy by the defendant will not affect the defend-
ant's ultimate liability in another forum, the chance of recovery of
any judgment the plaintiff may eventually obtain will be greatly
diminished.
Finally, a state, before adopting its own Seider doctrine, should
consider the cost involved. An insurance company that has to
defend an action removed from the place of the accident will have
65 The condition precedent found in most policies that the insured must
notify the company when sued would not be a problem in this type
of garnishment proceeding since the insurance company is the one
that is notified first.
66 Pupkes v. Sailors, 183 Neb. 784, 164 N.W.2d 441 (1969); Iowa Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Meckna, 180 Neb. 516, 144 N.W.2d 73 (1966); M.F.A.
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sailors, 180 Neb. 201, 141 N.W.2d 846 (1966).
67 183 Neb. 784, 164 N.W.2d 441 (1969).
68 Id. at 788-89, 164 N.W.2d at 444.
COMMENTS
to bear certain costs it would not normally face. Witnesses, inves-
tigating police officers, and the defendant, will have to be trans-
ported and supported during the trial. The insurance company may
choose not to pay these expenses but then it is faced with the prob-
lem of obtaining an adequate defense in the litigation. In any
event, expenses will soar, resulting eventually in higher insurance
rates for the public in general. The plaintiff's expenses will increase
also. Witnesses will have to be brought to the forum and other
expenses will occur in prosecuting the suit. If the plaintiff's juris-
diction typically awards larger judgments than the accident forum,
this may offset the additional expense.69 In such a state, however,
adoption of the Seider doctrine will increase the number of cases
on the dockets, unless other states adopt a similar method of juris-
diction. Since there does not appear to be such a movement 0 a
Seider state would not only have the accident litigation involving
Seider rationale, but also cases where the accident occurred in the
state. This increase in the court load could cost the citizens of the
state substantially more than that saved by those few citizens who
could benefit from the Seider rule-the plaintiffs who are able to
litigate in their home forum.
These points should be carefully considered by the courts and
the legislature before any move toward adopting the principles of
the Seider case is instigated.
V. CONCLUSION
A plaintiff usually desires to use the courts of his own state for
the sake of convenience and expediency. This may be particularly
true when the litigation involves an out-of-state accident with a
nonresident driver. This desire cannot violate constitutional prin-
ciples, however. To obtain in personam jurisdiction over the de-
fendant, whether alive or dead:
[It is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.71
69 See Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 316, 234 N.E.2d 669, 675,
287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 641 (1967) (Breitel, J., concurring opinion).
70 Cases not following the rationale that an insurance policy covering
liability is garnishable are Farmers Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Noel, 211
F. Supp. 216 (W.D. Mo. 1962) (dictum); Jordon v. Shelby Mutual
Ins. Co., 175 So. 2d 233 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965); Burch v. Wargo, 1 Mich.
App. 365, 136 N.W.2d 750 (1965) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds,
378 Mich. 200, 144 N.W.2d 342 (1966); Housley v. Anaconda Co., 19
Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967); Gray v. Houck, 167 Tenn. 233, 68
S.W.2d 117 (1934).
71 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
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This "purposeful act" of a deceased defendant cannot be found in
the state court's appointment of an administrator.
Even though in personam jurisdiction cannot be obtained over
the out-of-state defendant, without a voluntary appearance or being
served in the state, the plaintiff can still proceed to acquire in rem
or quasi in rem jurisdiction if an asset of the defendant can be
found in the state. A contract of insurance to cover liability of the
defendant appears to be an asset that has the potential of allowing
a plaintiff to acquire this jurisdiction.
In a forecast of future events under the Seider rationale, that a
liability insurance policy is an asset sufficient to establish quasi in
rem jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, it has been ob-
served:
If its constitutionality is upheld, it is quite likely that all fifty
states will be compelled to enact like measures. As a result each
party will commence suit as quickly as possible in an endeavor
to have the litigation in the state where he resides. It would also
appear to be a natural and logical consequence of the approval of
the Seider procedure that retaliatory laws will be adopted by
other states to impose certain conditions upon residents from
Seider-procedure states to protect the states' own residents from
being subject to the jurisdiction of the foreign state. This is likely
to impose a serious burden on interstate travel and commerce.
It is also reasonably certain that the adoption of this procedure
will work a substantial increase in the cost of insurance, which
is not in the public interest.7 2
Watson v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp.73 established that a
state has sufficient interest in a contract of liability insurance to
force an insurer to answer and defend in a state where the plaintiff
resides and was injured even though the defendant is not subject
to in personam jurisdiction. The question left unanswered by the
court is whether the state in which the plaintiff resides has "suffi-
cient interest" when the injuries occurred in another state. On this
answer rests the validity of the rationale of both Calkins v. Witt
and Seider v. Roth.
Stephen A. Mazurak '70
72 Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 117 (2nd Cir. 1968) (Anderson,
J., dissenting opinion).
73 348 V.S. 66 (1954).
